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1 Introduction
One of the most intriguing features of traditional Keynesian theory (Keynes,
1936, Hicks, 1937) is the so called “multiplier eﬀect” by which an increase
in governement spending can create an increase in consumption, whereas in
Walrasian models it leads to a decrease, via the usual “crowding out” eﬀect.
This multiplier eﬀect is customarily attributed to price or wage rigidities.
Now in the recent evolution of macroeconomic modelling most macroe-
conomic issues are reexamined within the rigorous framework of dynamic
intertemporal maximizing models à la Ramsey (1928). The typical model
depicts consumers as one single dynasty of infinitely lived agents. This model
has notably the property of “Ricardian equivalence” (Barro, 1974), accord-
ing to which, in a nutshell, the distribution of taxes across time is irrelevant
as long as the government balances its budget intertemporally. The model
has been extended to a monetary framework (Sidrauski, 1969, Brock, 1975),
where Ricardian equivalence also holds.
In line with this recent evolution, a natural question to ask is whether
a multiplier eﬀect will arise in these dynamic models. The result has been
actually disappointing: crowding out occurs in the usual DSGE model (see
for example Fatas and Mihov, 2001), and even in models with price rigidities
under standard parameterizations (see for example Collard and Dellas, 2005).
What we want to show in this paper is that, in order to obtain a strong
enough multiplier eﬀect, another ingredient, in addition to price rigidities,
has to be introduced in dynamic models. Namely one should not only have
price rigidities, but also model the economy as “non Ricardian”. By non Ri-
cardian economies we mean, as in Barro (1974), economies like overlapping
generations (OLG) economies à la Samuelson (1958), where Ricardian equiv-
alence does not hold. The non Ricardian economy we shall work with is due
to Weil (1987, 1991). It is a monetary economy where, as in the Ricardian
model, agents have an infinite life but, as in the OLG model, new agents
arrive over time.
We shall call n the rate of growth of the population. In a nutshell the
results are: If n > 0, there is a multiplier1, and government spending leads
to an increase in private consumption. This multiplier is larger, the higher
n is, i.e. the more “non Ricardian” the economy is.
1By this we mean more precisely that the income multiplier is greater than one, so that
there is no crowding out.
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2 The model
We shall thus use the model of Weil (1987, 1991), which has the great ad-
vantage of having the Ricardian model as a particular case. Each household
lives forever, but new “generations” are born every period. Denote as Nt
the number of households alive at time t. We will work below with a con-
stant rate of growth of the population n ≥ 0, so that Nt = (1 + n)tN0. The
Ricardian model corresponds to the special limit case n = 0.
2.1 Households
Consider a household born in period j. We denote by cjt, yjt and mjt his
consumption, endowment and money holdings at time t ≥ j. This household
maximizes the following utility function:
Ujt =
∞X
s=t
βs−tLog cjs (1)
and is submitted in period t to a “cash in advance” constraint:
Ptcjt ≤ mjt (2)
Household j begins period t with a financial wealth ωjt. First the bond
market opens, and the household lends an amount bjt at the nominal interest
rate it. The rest is kept under the form of money mjt, so that:
ωjt = mjt + bjt (3)
Then the goods market opens, and the household sells his endowment yjt,
pays taxes τ jt in real terms and consumes cjt, subject to the cash constraint
(2). Consequently, the budget constraint for household j is:
ωjt+1 = (1 + it)ωjt − itmjt + Ptyjt − Ptτ jt − Ptcjt (4)
2.2 Aggregation, endowments and taxes
Aggregate quantities are obtained by summing the various individual vari-
ables. There are Nj −Nj−1 agents in generation j, so for example aggregate
taxes Tt are given by:
Tt =
X
j≤t
(Nj −Nj−1) τ jt (5)
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The other aggregate quantities, Yt, Ct,Ωt,Mt andBt, are deduced through
similar formulas from the individual variables, yjt, cjt, ωjt,mjt and bjt.
We now have to describe the distribution of endowments and taxes among
households. We assume that all households have the same income and taxes:
yjt = yt =
Yt
Nt
τ jt = τ t =
Tt
Nt
(6)
3 The dynamic equations
3.1 Taxes and government budget constraint
The dynamics of government liabilities Ωt is:
Ωt+1 = (1 + it)Ωt − itMt + PtGt − PtTt (7)
Government budget balance corresponds to Ωt+1 = Ωt, i.e. since Ωt =
Mt +Bt:
PtGt = PtTt − itBt (8)
We would like to have a tax index Tt such that budget balance is achieved
under the traditional condition:
Gt = Tt (9)
This will be the case if we define Tt through:
PtTt = PtTt − itBt (10)
Budget balance now corresponds to (9), and the government budget con-
straint (7) is rewritten as:
Ωt+1 = Ωt + PtGt − PtTt (11)
3.2 Consumption dynamics
The dynamics of consumption is given by (see the appendix):
Pt+1Ct+1 = β (1 + n) (1 + it)PtCt − (1− β)nΩt+1 (12)
The dynamic system consists of equations (11) and (12).
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4 The multiplier
We shall assume that nominal prices are fully rigid, now and in the future.
Besides simplifying the algebra this assumption, which is clearly the most
favourable situation for a multiplier eﬀect to arise, will allow to make crys-
talclear that a non Ricardian environment plays a central role in addition
to price rigidities. We also assume that the nominal interest rate is pegged
(it = i). Now equation (12) is rewritten:
PtCt = γPt+1Ct+1 + γ (1− β)nΩt+1
= γPt+1Ct+1 + γ (1− β)n (Ωt + PtGt − PtTt) (13)
with:
γ =
1
β (1 + n) (1 + i)
(14)
We shall assume γ < 12. Integrating forward equation (13) we obtain:
PtCt = γ (1− β)n
∞X
j=0
γj (Ωt+j + Pt+jGt+j − Pt+jTt+j) (15)
Now from (11):
Ωt+j = Ωt +
j−1X
k=0
Pt+k (Gt+k − Tt+k) (16)
so that:
∞X
j=0
γjΩt+j =
∞X
j=0
γj
"
Ωt +
j−1X
i=0
Pt+k (Gt+k − Tt+k)
#
=
Ωt
1− γ +
∞X
k=0
Pt+k (Gt+k − Tt+k)
∞X
j=k+1
γj
=
Ωt
1− γ +
∞X
k=0
γk+1
1− γPt+k (Gt+k − Tt+k) (17)
and finally, inserting (17) into (15):
2This condition also plays a role for price determinacy in models with market clearing.
See Bénassy (2005) for a formal analysis and economic discussion.
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PtCt =
γ (1− β)n
1− γ
"
Ωt +
∞X
j=0
γjPt+j (Gt+j − Tt+j)
#
(18)
So with n > 0 consumption reacts positively to government spending,
and from formula (18) the multiplier is greater, the higher n is.
5 Conclusion
We have thus seen that in order to obtain a “multiplier”, price rigidities
are not the only decisive ingredient, but it is also important to have a “non
Ricardian” economy, corresponding here to n > 0. We shall now give a brief
intuition for this.
Let us start with the limit case n = 0. As we shall now see the argument
is quite reminiscent of the famous “balanced budget multiplier” of Haavelmo
(1945). Consider indeed an increase in government spending, say Gt, all
other spending variables being held constant. Because of the government’s
intertemporal budget constraint, Gt will have to be compensated by taxes,
either now or in the future, and the total discounted value of these taxes must
be exactly equal to Gt. As a result we have a “balanced budget” formula, as
in Haavelmo.
Now if n > 0, new generations arrive over time, and the future, but yet
unborn, generations will bear some of the future taxes. So there is part of
government spending that will not be paid by currently alive generations,
and as a result the traditional multiplier mechanism comes into play.
6 Appendix: derivation of equation (12)
We shall derive in this appendix the dynamic equation (12). Consider the
household’s budget equation (4). We assume that it is strictly positive, so
households always want to satisfy the “cash in advance” equation (2) exactly.
We thus have mjt = Ptcjt and equation (4) is rewritten:
ωjt+1 = (1 + it)ωjt + Ptyt − Ptτ t − (1 + it)Ptcjt (19)
Define the intertemporal discount factors:
Rt =
t−1Y
s=0
1
1 + is
R0 = 1 (20)
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Applying the discount factors (20) to the budget constraint (19), it be-
comes:
Rs+1ωjs+1 = Rsωjs +Rs+1Ps (ys − τ s)−RsPscjs (21)
If we aggregate all discounted budget constraints (21) from time t to
infinity, and assume that Rsωjs goes to zero as s goes to infinity (the usual
transversality condition), we obtain the intertemporal budget constraint of
the household:
∞X
s=t
RsPscjs = Rtωjt +
∞X
s=t
Rs+1Ps (ys − τ s) (22)
Now maximizing utility function (1) subject to the intertemporal budget
constraint (22) yields the following consumption function for a household j:
RtPtcjt = (1− β)
"
Rtωjt +
∞X
s=t
Rs+1Ps (ys − τ s)
#
(23)
Summing this across the Nt agents alive in period t, we obtain the aggre-
gate consumption Ct:
RtPtCt = (1− β)
"
RtΩt +Nt
∞X
s=t
Rs+1Ps (ys − τ s)
#
(24)
In equilibrium Yt = Ct +Gt, so the equilibrium equation is:
RtPt (Yt −Gt) = (1− β)
"
RtΩt +Nt
∞X
s=t
Rs+1Ps (ys − τ s)
#
(25)
Divide both sides by Nt and use Yt = Ntyt, Gt = Ntgt:
RtPt (yt − gt) = (1− β)
"
RtΩt
Nt
+
∞X
s=t
Rs+1Ps (ys − τ s)
#
(26)
Let us rewrite this equation for t+1 and subtract it from (26). We obtain:
RtPt (yt − gt)−Rt+1Pt+1 (yt+1 − gt+1) =
(1− β)
·
RtΩt
Nt
− Rt+1Ωt+1
Nt+1
+Rt+1Pt (yt − τ t)
¸
(27)
Now multiply the government’s budget equation (7) by Rt+1/Nt:
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RtΩt
Nt
=
Rt+1Ωt+1
Nt
+ (Rt −Rt+1)Pt (yt − gt)−Rt+1Ptgt +Rt+1Ptτ t (28)
Insert this into equation (27):
Rt+1Pt+1 (yt+1 − gt+1) = βRtPt (yt − gt)− (1− β)
µ
1
Nt
− 1
Nt+1
¶
Rt+1Ωt+1
(29)
and multiply by Nt+1/Rt+1:
Pt+1 (Yt+1 −Gt+1) = β
Nt+1
Nt
(1 + it)Pt (Yt −Gt)− (1− β)
µ
Nt+1
Nt
− 1
¶
Ωt+1
(30)
Taking finally Nt+1/Nt = 1 + n, and using Ct = Yt −Gt we obtain:
Pt+1Ct+1 = β (1 + n) (1 + it)PtCt − (1− β)nΩt+1 (31)
which is equation (12).
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